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The authors teach Civil Advocacy, a course that simulates a complex litigation from
initial client interview through trial. The litigation involves, among other things, difficult
questions about the scope and meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). See Brown, Givelber
& Subrin, There Are No Good Advocates in Cubbyholes, LEARNING & L., Winter 1975, at 55.
This experience convinced our students and ourselves that neither courts nor commen-
tators had articulated a precise and comprehensive definition of the elements of a prima
facie case under § 1982. We are grateful to the Civil Advocacy students of the past two
years, whose work in the field of housing discrimination law was invaluable in helping us
to identify the problems with which this Article is concerned. In addition, we wish to
thank our students, Ms. Mary Lyndon, Mr. Ronald Witmer, Ms. Kate Kaplan, and Ms.
Nancy Lorenz, for assisting us in the preparation of this Article.
' Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
2 Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144. The commentators disagree
about the purpose of the 1870 legislation. The debate centers around the scope of
congressional authority to pass the initial legislation pursuant to § 2 of the thirteenth
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42 of the United States Code. Those sections lay virtually
moribund for a hundred years, 3 until they were revived in 1968
as a judicial contribution to the mid-twentieth century civil rights
movement. 4 Passed in the wake of Union victory, the 1866 Civil
Rights Act represented an attempt by the victors to crystallize the
metaphysics of emancipation into the perquisites of citizenship
and to give "real content to the freedom guaranteed by the Thir-
teenth Amendment."5 The language of section 1982 is decep-
tively simple: "All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property.
' '6
amendment. It has been suggested that Congress felt that the later legislation was neces-
sary to protect the 1866 statute under congressional authority pursuant to § 5 of the
fourteenth amendment, thus placing its constitutionality beyond doubt. See Pennsylvania
v. Local 542, Operating Eng'rs, 347 F. Supp. 268, 288-89 (E.D. Pa. 1972); cf. J.
TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 201 (rev. ed. 1965) (originally published as THE
ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951)) [hereinafter cited as
TENBROEK]; Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 SuP. CT. REV.
89, 122. Other commentators feel that the 1870 statute merely made selective additions
(such as enforcement provisions) to the 1866 statute. See Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of
1866, Its Hour Come Round at Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272,
293-99 (1969).
The reason for this debate seems to be an attempt to discover through legislative
history whether the 1866 Civil Rights Act contains a requirement of "state action." The
United States Supreme Court responded negatively in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968). But see Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The
Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV.
449, 486-88 (1974).
The 1870 legislation has also given rise to a secondary debate involving the effect, if
any, of the changes caused by that reenactment. The Supreme Court noted in Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer, supra at 436-37, that the scope of the 1866 statute was not altered when
it was reenacted in 1870. Similarly, it has been held that the change from the word
"citizens" in § 1 of the 1866 Act to the words "all persons" in §§ 16 and 18 of the 1870
Act did not change the meaning of the original statute. Pennsylvania v. Local 542,
Operating Eng'rs, supra at 288-90.
3 See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323
(1926); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882). The Supreme Court in Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437, expressly stated that § 1982's partial and
temporary dormancy did not diminish its force.
4 The revival was accomplished in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968).
1 Id. at 433. Many commentators have noted this congressional intent to confer
first-class citizenship upon the newly emancipated slaves. See Note, supra note 2, at
502-03; Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Anti-Discrimination
Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1019 (1969); Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Prelimi-
nary Analysis, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1294 (1969). The most thorough discussion of this aspect
of the legislative history appears in TENBROEK, supra note 2, passim.
6 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
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Since 1968 there has been considerable litigation under this
statute, but little appreciation of the ambiguity of the words
"same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens." Decisions tend to
discuss the evidence presented in great detail without relating
that evidence to a carefully drawn definition of the statutory
language and the elements of the prima facie case which that
definition should supply. Until we know what the plaintiff must
prove, however, evidentiary analysis lacks direction, and until we
know what the statutory language means, there will be no consis-
tent approach to what the plaintiff must prove.
7
In this Article we shall attempt to define the words "same
right.., as is enjoyed by white citizens," to set forth the elements
of the prima facie case derived therefrom, and to consider what
evidence, inferences, and presumptions would permit a plaintiff
to establish those elements. Our inqu1iry is pertinent not only to
section 1982 cases: Section 19818 contains parallel language with
respect to contract actions, and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 19689 (as well as several state and local statutes) is directed to
7 This method of addressing the problem is sound because it forces close attention to
what the statute actually says and to the relationship between meaning and proof. This is
important both for litigating § 1982 cases and for guiding private conduct. Most people
tend to translate legal rules into a series of "dos" and "don'ts" for guidance in their
everyday affairs. These "dos" and "don'ts" depend primarily on the perception of what
behavior predictably produces liability, as opposed to a more abstract perception of legal
principles.
The primary rights and duties with which jurisprudence busies itself again are
nothing but prophecies. One of the many evil effects of the confusion between
legal and moral ideas ... is that theory is apt to get the cart before the horse,
and to consider the right or the duty as something existing apart from and
independent of the consequences of its breach, to which certain sanctions are
added afterward. But, as I shall try to show, a legal duty so called is nothing but
a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer
in this or that way by judgment of the court;-and so of a legal right.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 458 (1897).
8 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970). The Supreme Court has made it clear that the pas-
sage of Title VIII did not diminish the effectiveness of § 1982. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 416-17 (1968).
The coverage of § 1982 is significantly broader than the coverage of Title VIII.
Section 1982 covers the small landlord while § 803(b) of Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)
(1970), exempts most direct sales or rentals of single family houses by owners and rentals
of units in owner occupied dwellings containing less than four units. This exemption
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similar ends. Therefore, while our definition of the "same right"
language is most relevant to sections 1982 and 1981, our discus-
sion of evidentiary considerations is also applicable to civil rights
litigation in general.
I. "SAME RIGHT" AS Is ENJOYED BY WHITE CITIZENS:
ITS MEANING AND ROLE IN A PRIMA FACIE CASE
Section 1982 broadly declares that all citizens shall enjoy the
"same rights" in property transactions0 as are enjoyed by white
citizens. Yet the statute neither defines the precise content of
those "rights" nor identifies whose obligation it is to ensure their
availability to "all citizens." The latter problem was addressed by
the Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.II The Court
rejected the interpretation that section 1982 requires state
action-that it guarantees only legal rights, created by govern-
does not apply to § 1982. Morris v. Cizek, 503 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1974); see Note, supra
note 2, at 475-76. Moreover, Title VIII applies only to dwellings, while § 1982 applies not
only to real and personal property, but also to all realty-large and small, residential and
commercial.
In addition, certain procedural requirements which are absent from § 1982 en-
cumber Title VIII. Although Title VIII litigants must first exhaust their administrative
remedies, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)-(d) (1970), the exhaustion doctrine is not applicable to
§ 1982 cases. Also, the Tide VIII statute of limitations, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(b) (1970) (180
days), is appreciably shorter than the time period for bringing suit under § 1982. See
Hickman v. Fincher, 483 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1973) (South Carolina's one-year statute of
limitations applicable to § 1982 cause of action).
For an analysis of the other differences between Title VIII and § 1982, see Smedley,
A Comparative Analysis of Title VIII and Section 1982, 22 VAND. L. REv. 459 (1969); Note,
Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 1019 (1969).
10 We shall not discuss the precise nature of the type of property rights covered by
§ 1982. The statute enumerates the rights to "inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property." The courts have given a broad interpretation to the
items on this list. See, e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431
(1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Sims v. Order of
United Commercial Travelers of America, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1972).
A similarly broad interpretation has been given to the contract rights language of
§ 1981. See, e.g., Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970);
Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd in
relevant part sub nom. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), petition
for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3054 (U.S. July 10, 1975) (No. 75-62); cf. Riley v. Adirondack
Southern School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 1973), appeal docketed, No.
74-1976, 5th Cir., Apr. 15, 1974; Grier v. Specialized Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856
(W.D.N.C. 197 1). But cf. Cook v. Advertiser Co., 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972); Housing
Authority v. Henry, 334 F. Supp. 490 (D.N.J. 1971).
For a case involving both § 1982 property rights and § 1981 contract rights, see
Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974).
" 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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ment and capable of being denied only by government.' 2 Hold-
ing that a private real estate developer's racially motivated re-
fusal to sell a house to a black violates section 1982, the Court
appeared to suggest an expansive reading of the "same right"
language:
Negro citizens ... would be left with "a mere paper
guarantee" if Congress were powerless to assure that a
dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase the same
thing as a dollar in the hands of a white man. At the
very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to
secure under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the
freedom to buy whatever a white man can buy, the right
to live wherever a white man can live. If Congress can-
not say that being a free man means at least this much,
then the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the
Nation cannot keep.
13
In neither of its subsequent section 1982 decisions,' 4 however,
has the Court clarified what it means to be free "to buy whatever
a white man can buy" or "to live wherever a white man can live."
A. Two Categories of Definition
When a plaintiff brings suit under section 1982, the harm
he or she alleges is the denial by the defendant of the "same right
... as is enjoyed by white citizens." A definition of that phrase
thus supplies at least two elements of plaintiff's prima facie case:
the actionable conduct or omission (the failure to accord the
plaintiff the same right as white citizens), and plaintiff's harm
(being denied that right).
12 Although § 1982 is not limited to the behavior of the government, its mandate
obviously applies to governmental action. Even though the technical bonds of slavery had
been dissolved by the adoption of the thirteenth amendment, the prevalence of the
infamous Black Codes continued to limit black people to second-class citizenship.
TENBROEK, supra note 2, at 174-97.
The United States Supreme Court held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. that Con-
gress was fully empowered by the thirteenth amendment to enact § 1982 and that the
thirteenth amendment authorized Congress not only to dissolve the bonds of master and
slave, but also to determine the badges and incidents of slavery, whether or not the
product of governmental action, and to remove those badges and incidents by legislation.
392 U.S. at 437-44.
13 392 U.S. at 443 (footnote omitted).
14 Since Jones, only two § 1982 cases have reached the Supreme Court: Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973), and Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
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Our analysis suggests that case law has developed two basic
theories of "same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens." One
view is that a non-white is entitled to be treated as a white would
have been treated by the particular defendant. Under this defi-
nition, the defendant creates by his or her own treatment of
whites the rights to be accorded to a non-white. This we charac-
terize as the "defendant-oriented view." The other view is that a
plaintiff is entitled to the type of treatment society normally
accords whites. 15 This we call the "community-oriented view.'
' 6
1. The Defendant-Oriented View
The defendant-oriented view of "same right" defines the
right in terms of how the particular defendant would have
treated a white person. The only way to answer the "would have"
question is by inquiring into defendant's motivation. This is most
clearly the case when the defendant has not dealt with whites
under similar circumstances; there are then no facts about how
the defendant actually treats similarly situated whites. The only
objective facts relate to treatment of a black. But even if the
defendant has previously dealt with whites, or if there were a
tester,17 the defendant-oriented view still calls for a motivational
inquiry. In every case there are a vast number of reasons why
people may or may not have been willing to engage in a property
transaction. No plaintiff will be able to demonstrate a completely
identical situation in which the defendant dealt with a white. Nor
will a plaintiff be able to prove that he or she meets all of the
criteria that a defendant may potentially use in choosing with
whom to deal. It will always be the case that the defendant might
have treated a white in the same way as he or she treated the
15 Although the cases do not use the terminology we have employed, for examples of
the "defendant-oriented view," see Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1973);
Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151, 161-63 (N.D. Ohio 1969). For examples of the
"community-oriented view," see Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 330-34
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974); Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495
F.2d 1333, 1340-42 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819,
826-28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974).
16 The difference between these theories is actually more complex than this simple
dichotomy suggests. Regardless of how one reads the statute, the defendant's state of
mind is relevant. See text accompanying notes 25-29, 73-74, 80-87 infra.
17 The function of a tester in real estate transactions is to determine how a given
lessor or seller responds to a white person who is apparently seeking to deal with the
lessor or seller. The person who acts as a tester "tests" whether property is available, and,
if so, on what terms. The purpose of a tester is to help discourage discriminatory prac-
tices and to facilitate proof in discrimination cases.
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non-white plaintiff. Consequently, the reasons for the treat-
ment-the defendant's motivation-are critical in determining
how the defendant would have treated a white person.
There is thus a violation of section 1982 under the defen-
dant-oriented view when the defendant's sentiments about race
cause his or her disadvantageous treatment of blacks. This, we
assume, is what courts mean when they refer to racial
motivation.' 8 When the plaintiff proves racial motivation, he or
she establishes two elements of the prima facie case: the act and
the harm prohibited by section 1982.
The defendant-oriented view solves the simple cases of
discrimination-"I won't rent to you because you're black"--and
some harder ones as well. Under this view, plaintiff also prevails
in a case in which a defendant treats blacks and whites alike in a
given transaction in a sophisticated effort to avoid dealing with
blacks at all. For instance, a landlord might apply a policy of
renting only to people recommended by existing tenants, and,
pursuant to this policy, reject applications from both blacks and
whites.' 9 Also, a defendant who deals only with blacks can violate
section 1982 if the race of his or her tenants or buyers influences
his or her treatment of them.2 0 If the defendant's act disadvan-
tageous to the plaintiff is racially motivated, the defendant vio-
lates section 1982.
18 It is possible to construct a defendant-oriented test that does not look exclusively
to racial motivation. For instance, one could interpret § 1982 to mean that a defendant
currently or previously dealing with whites must accord blacks identical treatment
regardless of whether any difference in treatment is racially motivated, whereas defen-
dants who do not currently and have not previously dealt with whites violate the statute
only if their treatment of blacks is racially motivated. This construct, however-that the
legal definition of the statute differs if one has never dealt with whites-is an utterly
irrational reading of § 1982. While prior experience with whites is undoubtedly relevant
to proof (and to available inferences), it cannot control the meaning of the statutory
language.
19 Cf. Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021
(1974); Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974); Local 53,
Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
20 Whether § 1982 prohibits better treatment of non-whites because of race is beyond
the scope of this Article. The issue is whether the statute should be read as a non-
discrimination statute or as a statute prohibiting only disadvantageous treatment of
non-whites. If the latter reading is correct, then § 1982 would not prohibit more advan-
tageous treatment of non-whites than of whites. Cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974), vacating as moot, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973). This will be an issue only
with respect to those transactions not covered by Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970), because § 804(a) of that statute, id. § 3604(a), seems to
prohibit any failure to deal because of race. For a further discussion of Tide VIII, see
note 9 supra.
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As we shall try to demonstrate, however, racial motivation
should not be the exclusive test of liability. Suppose that the
particular defendant does not treat blacks and whites differently
and there is no direct evidence of racial motivation, yet whites in
the community consistently receive better treatment with respect
to the same type of transaction. Under the definition of "same
right" that we advocate, plaintiff may still be able to establish a
violation of section 1982.
2. The Community-Oriented View
There is another approach to the "same right" language of
section 1982 which avoids the necessity of proving the
defendant's racial motivation, and which is more in keeping with
the statute's purposes. Under this view a plaintiff is entitled to
the same rights that society affords similarly situated whites in
similar property transactions. The plaintiff, therefore, is not
faced with the task of proving how this particular defendant
would have treated the plaintiff had the plaintiff been white, a
task compelling inquiry into racial motivation. As we shall
show, 21 however, the community-oriented test still requires an
inquiry into motivation, but the inquiry is significantly different
from that required under the defendant-oriented view.
In the recent cases of Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc. 22 and
Love v. DeCarlo Homes, Inc. ,23 the Seventh and Fifth Circuits, re-
spectively, addressed the issue whether the "same right" lan-
guage of section 1982 encompasses more than the right to be
free of racially motivated disadvantageous treatment. The
gravamen of the complaints in both cases was similar: that the
defendants had sold homes to the black plaintiffs on terms less
advantageous than a white could typically secure when purchas-
ing a home, and that a segregated housing market left the plain-
tiffs little choice other than to deal with the defendants. In
neither case was there evidence that the actual homes in question
were offered to whites on terms different from those offered to
blacks.
In Love, the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiffs had failed to
2' See text accompanying notes 25-29, 73-74, 80-87 infra.
22 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974).
23 482 F.2d 613 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1115 (1973).
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establish a prima facie case.24 Plaintiffs were more successful in
the Seventh Circuit. In addition to holding that there was suffi-
cient evidence to get to the jury on the theory of racial
motivation,2 5 the court in Clark also held that plaintiffs had es-
tablished a prima facie case under section 1982 by introducing
evidence tending to show (a) the existence of a racially segre-
gated dual housing market in Chicago, and (b) that the defen-
dants took advantage of or exploited 26 the dual housing market
by selling homes to blacks on terms substantially less favorable
than the terms upon which similarly situated whites were able to
purchase similar housing in the Chicago area. According to the
court, this evidence shifted the burden to the defendants to
come forward with a "legitimate non-discriminatory" explana-
tion for their behavior in order to escape liability. The court
rejected the defendant's argument that "to charge whatever the
market will bear" is a "legitimate non-discriminatory" explana-
tion.2
7
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 2 8 arose on a demurrer to plain-
tiff's complaint alleging racial motivation. The case thus was
consistent with the defendant-oriented view, although it did not
exclude the possibility of a community-oriented test. Clark rep-
resents a significant advance in the law under section 1982 be-
cause the court recognized that the words "same right ... as is
enjoyed by white citizens" could mean rights created by the
treatment accorded to whites by persons other than the-defen-
dant. Under the Seventh Circuit's community-oriented view,
therefore, it is not necessary in every case that the defendant,
by his treatment of whites, create the right that the defendant
24 Plaintiff failed to do so because the evidence did not demonstrate that similarly
situated whites could purchase similar homes on more advantageous terms elsewhere.
482 F.2d at 615-16. The court thus was not compelled to decide whether a violation of
§ 1982 could be established without direct proof of conscious racial motivation on the
part of the defendants.
25 501 F.2d at 330. The Clark court did not label the theory "racial motivation," yet
its reference to "the traditional theory of discrimination" must be taken to refer to this
theory. The Seventh Circuit noted that a prima facie case existed if the defendant treated
similarly situated whites better than the black plaintiff. This characterization tends to
confuse evidence of the test with the test itself.
26 For an early analysis of "exploitation" as "racial unconscionability," see Note, Dis-
criminatory Housing Markets, Racial Unconscionability, and Section 1988: The Contract
Buyers League Case, 80 YALE L.J. 516 (1971).
27 501 F.2d at 331-34.
28 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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denies non-whites.2 9 We shall now examine each view in greater
detail.
B. Difflculties with the Defendant-Oriented View
The Seventh Circuit is correct in perceiving that the "same
right" language of section 1982 can refer to rights created by the
action of persons other than the defendant. There is nothing in
the language of the statute that suggests that the reference to
''same right" is limited to rights created only by the defendant.
Indeed, there is no mention of defendants at all. Nor is there
anything in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. to indicate that the sta-
tute is so narrow; on the contrary, the Supreme Court's reading
of the scope of congressional power to enact the statute suggests
that a broad reading of section 1982 is proper. Nor does the
legislative history indicate that a defendant-oriented view of the
language is appropriate. 30 The central, albeit unresolved, ques-
tion emerging from the congressional debate was whether the
purpose of the legislation was to achieve equality of treatment
for blacks and whites, or to provide for equality of achievement
between blacks and whites, or to endow everybody-both blacks
and whites-with a bundle of natural law rights.3 1 The
defendant-oriented view seeks equality of treatment only to the
extent that the defendant is consciously denying it, inherently
eliminates the possibility of a policy of equality of achievement
(for example, affirmative action to redress the effects of past
discrimination), and looks to defendant-created rights as op-
posed to rights in the community at large.
The Supreme Court has viewed other congressional bans on
racial discrimination as reaching conduct other than that which
29 InJones, the Supreme Court spoke in terms of "racially motivated" conduct, thus
defining the right in terms of the defendant's mental state. The procedural pos-
ture of that case did not necessitate consideration of any broader definition of the right.
In Clark, the Seventh Circuit expanded the definition of right, but did not indicate a
particular culpable state of mind with which a defendant must have acted in denying that
right to the plaintiff. We shall address these issues in more detail at text accompanying
notes 73-74, 80-87 infra.
'0 Indeed, the congressional debates appear to reflect little more than the predom-
inant philosophies of the day: social contract, natural law, and abolitionism. TENBROEK,
supra note 2, at 174-97.
3lId. For a thorough explanation of the difference between equality of treatment
and equality of achievement, see Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHi. L. REV.
235, 237-49 (1971).
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is racially motivated. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,32 the Court
found that the evidence did not support a conclusion that Duke
Power was responsible for the conditions that caused blacks to do
more poorly than whites on an employment test. Yet the Court
interpreted section 703(h) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196433 to prohibit tests that excluded blacks, but not whites,
from favored positions, unless it was shown that the tests were
related to job performance.34 The language in Title VIP3 5 goes
no further than to prohibit racial discrimination, which Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co. indicated is the function of section "1982 in
property transactions. The Title VII cases support the view that
a congressional ban on racial discrimination is entitled to a broad
reading, one that goes beyond a prohibition of consciously in-
consistent treatment of the races. 36 Recent cases involving both
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 196837 and section 1982 are
in accord.3
8
A glance at the history of the housing industry in this coun-
try makes it clear that there are significant public policy reasons
why section 1982 should receive a broad reading. It is beyond
question that the housing market has been, and continues to be,
segregated by race.39 It is equally beyond question that, at least
32 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
33 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
34 The Griggs decision is particularly interesting when read in light of the prohibition
against preferential treatment in section 7030) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)
(1970).
35 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970).
6 See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1971).
37 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970).
38 For cases involving section 1982, see, e.g., Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501
F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974); Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club,
Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974); cf. Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974). But see Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
For Tide VIII, see, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 2656 (1975); Joseph Skillken Co. v. City of Toledo, 380 F.
Supp. 228 (N.D. Ohio 1974). Contra, Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975).
39See, e.g., R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND USE
REGULATION AND HOUSING IN THE 1970's (1973); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN
PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1968); NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DIScRIMINATION IN HOUSING & URBAN LAND
INSTITUTE, FAIR HOUSING AND EXCLUSIONARY LAND USE (ULI Research Report No. 23,
1974); UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA
(1974); UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1961 REPORT: HOUSING (1961).
For a representative sampling of the cases, see Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1950 (1975); Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
until the late nineteen-sixties, the market was deliberately segre-
gated by race.40 Indeed, until Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., it was
considered lawful, in the absence of a state law to the contrary,
for private parties to discriminate against non-whites. This seg-
regation was not inadvertent or incidental to the operation of the
private real estate market; it was perceived as a means of main-
taining property values, and deliberately employed with that end
in mind. Many of the typical practices of the housing industry
were originally developed as a means of maintaining racial ex-
clusivity. 4' Where people now live, therefore, is in part a prod-
uct of overt racial discrimination. Moreover, as the real estate
market presently operates, where people live today is a highly
reliable indicator of where they will seek new housing. 42 The
terms and conditions under which people live substantially affect
the capital they can accumulate. 43 In short, the long history of
violation of the anti-discrimination mandate of section 1982 has
produced a real estate market that may be little affected by a ban
limited solely to racially motivated discrimination. It is clearly
racial discrimination for an industry that has contributed might-
ily to a segregated society to continue "business as usual" when
that business is conducted in a manner that treats non-whites
worse than it does whites for reasons attributable to race, even if
no longer consciously racially motivated.
Finally, the defendant-oriented view is unsatisfactory be-
cause of the type of proof of racial motivation it requires. This
requirement imposes an onerous and unwarranted burden on
the plaintiff. Because there is rarely direct evidence of a
defendant's thought processes, plaintiff's success in proving ra-
cial motivation depends in large measure upon the willingness of
factfinders to draw favorable inferences. There is reason to
doubt the neutrality of factfinders on this issue, the ability of
even neutral factfinders to make an accurate determination with
324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974); Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124
(7th Cir. 1972); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971),
affd per curiam, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
40 See authorities cited note 39 supra.
41 Id.
42 Id. See also Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use
Controls and the Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483 (1973).
43 Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 331 n.5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1070 (1974).
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respect to racial motivation, and the relevance of the issue at all.
Consider again, for example, the facts of Clark v. Universal
Builders, Inc.44 Plaintiffs introduced evidence tending to show
that the terms defendants charged them were worse than the
terms upon which similarly situated whites could purchase com-
parable housing in the Chicago area. Plaintiffs also introduced
credible evidence that the housing market in Chicago was segre-
gated, substantially limiting the areas where plaintiffs could
realistically hope to purchase homes.
Under the defendant-oriented view, these facts would not
require an explanation from defendants unless (a) they were
legally sufficient to justify the inference that race was a conscious
factor in Universal Builders' pricing policy and consequently that
defendants would have behaved differently had race not been a
consideration; and (b) the factfinder was willing to draw that
inference. Assuming that the facts are legally sufficient to sup-
port the inference, 45 the factfinder's willingness to draw the in-
ference may turn on the factfinder's own feelings about race.
Although all determinations of fact depend to some extent
on the factfinder's own perceptions of the world, asking fact-
finders to draw inferences with respect to something that is
probably unknowable-racial motivation-may be tantamount to
asking no more than what result they would like to see in a
particular case. This may be either desirable or unavoidable in
other areas of the law, but it is not suitable to race discrimination
cases. It is undesirable because of the danger that racial prej-
udice may influence the factfinder's decision, a decision which,
under traditional doctrines, would be very difficult for a review-
ing court to reverse.4 6 And it is readily avoidable by a broader
definition of "same right.
'47
44 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974).
45 See text accompanying notes 91-107 infra.
46 For cases in which the appellate court has done the unusual and reversed the
factfinder's decision, see Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 483 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1973); Smith v. Sol
D. Adler Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1971). Cf, e.g., Jennings v. Patterson, 488 F.2d 436
(5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Jerry Pals Real Estate, 485 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1973).
It was no accident that in the recent case of Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974),
the prospective tenant was arguing against jury trials while the landlord was arguing in
favor of them.
47 For cases in which it is at least arguable that the court has articulated a new
substantive rule of law in order to deal with the breakdown of reliable factfinding in cases
involving allegations of racial discrimination, see, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack,
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Even assuming that factfinders are genuinely neutral with
respect to race, their determinations of racial motivation may be
inaccurate for reasons beyond their control. The best source of
evidence on this point is the defendant, and he or she may not
be reliable on the subject either because the defendant chooses
not to describe his or her racial motivation accurately, or because
the defendant is unaware of his or her racial motivation. In the
absence of direct evidence of racial motivation, the factfinder
must make the difficult choice between the inferences from
defendant's conduct and defendant's non-racial explanation for
his or her behavior.
Ultimately, one must ask why liability under section 1982
ought to turn on racial motivation. There is nothing in the lan-
guage of the statute suggesting that motivation is important. The
statute is directed toward achieving a social result, not toward
punishing people with bad motives. 48 We therefore conclude
that a proper interpretation of section 1982 cannot include racial
motivation as the exclusive test of liability.
C. Difficulties with the Community-Oriented View
We have seen that there is a fundamental problem with
defining "same right ... as enjoyed by white citizens" in terms of
the specific defendant's treatment of white citizens. Under that
view, which we have called "defendant-oriented," a prima facie
case must include proof as to conscious racial motivation. In our
discussion of Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc. ,49 we saw that the
"same right" language can be defined in terms of a group other
than the defendant, namely, that class of people of whom the
508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 2656 (1975); Hawkins v. Town -of
Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc).
48 There is an argument that people may be on notice that they should not con-
sciously hold people's race against them in real estate transactions, but not on notice as to
a broader duty. The argument is not persuasive. First, this is not a criminal statute;
people may not have the same due process rights to "fair notice" under a civil statute as
attend criminal statutes. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 332-33 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974). Second, at a minimum every potential defendant
knows that he or she is dealing with a non-white, and is thus on notice that special legal
obligations may apply to the transaction. Finally, the problem of fair notice disappears
once a definitive standard for § 1982 is formulated. This is not to suggest that there are
no limits to how broadly § 1982 can be read; it is rather to suggest that there is no reason
to assume that the statute must be read to apply only to consciously racially motivated
disadvantageous treatment.
49 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974); see text accompanying
notes 25-29 supra.
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defendant is a member. For instance, in Clark the court looked to
how others dealing in single family homes treated whites situated
similarly to the black plaintiffs. This "other persons" definition,
which we characterize as "community-oriented," freed the plain-
tiff from the need to prove conscious racial motivation on the
part of the defendants. For reasons already stated, this is
desirable.
50
Yet there are problems with an "other persons" definition.
What does it mean? A lawyer faced with this question would
instinctively suggest one of two approaches: (1) How do other
people in fact treat white citizens under similar circumstances?
(custom) or (2) How would reasonable other people treat white
citizens under similar circumstances? (a reasonable person
test).51 As we shall try to demonstrate, however, neither of these
approaches is satisfactory, and we shall suggest a third approach:
How would people behave toward the plaintiff in a race-blind
society?
52
Defining "same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens" in
terms of the customary treatment of white persons in compara-
ble transactions may require individual defendants to treat
blacks "better" than they do whites competing in the same mar-
ket, or, to bastardize the statutory language, to give blacks special
50 See text accompanying notes 30-48 supra.
In the first published commentary on Clark the author rejects out of hand the court's
conclusion, 501 F.2d at 336-38, that evidence of gross disparity between profit margins
realized from defendants' operations in black and in white housing markets is sufficient
to make out a prima facie case under the "traditional" (defendant-oriented) view of
§ 1982. 88 HARV. L. REv. 1610, 1612 (1975). The commentator contends that the Clark
court was mistaken because such evidence suggests only "the developers' greater aware-
ness of price differentials between the two markets" and "this awareness is not equivalent
to discrimination." Id. However, to make out a prima facie case of racially motivated
discrimination it is not necessary that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff be "equiva-
lent to" such discrimination. It is only necessary that the evidence be such that it is
permissible for the factfinder to infer that the difference in pricing policies is racially
motivated. For a discussion of the appropriateness of such an inference, see text accom-
panying notes 91-107 infra.
5 It is necessary to offer an approach defined in terms of custom tempered by
reasonableness as an alternative to an approach where custom controls the definition
because the custom (or the group norm) may well be bigoted or irrational. For example,
if a white landlord's custom were to rent only to friends or relatives of existing tenants,
all of whom were white, then the custom itself would be the source of the discriminatory
conduct.
52 A "blindness to race" test has the limitation of requiring the black to start at a
point of equality with whites in terms of available dollars. Cf Wallace v. Debron Corp.,
363 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Mo. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Pike
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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rights in addition to the statutorily mandated rights of white
people. 53 Thus, it is theoretically possible that a given landlord
would be free to reject a long-bearded white prospective tenant,
but not a similarly hirsute black on the ground that he or she
dislikes long beards. This would be true if it could be shown that
landlords customarily do not reject typical tenants because of the
existence or length of beards even though this defendant cus-
tomarily does so. Moreover, the instances of preferential treat-
ment of blacks would increase if one were to opt for an inter-
pretation of "same right" as involving reasonable behavior. To
return to the example, the black would win even if he could
not prove that landlords generally ignore beards as long as he
could establish that the custom of considering beards is an un-
reasonable one.
54
The references to custom or to reasonable people therefore
raise the possibility that blacks would have a generalized right to
non-arbitrary treatment (as judged by custom or reasonableness)
in real estate transactions whereas whites would not.55 The new
-3 There may be questions with respect to congressional authority to enact legislation
under § 2 of the thirteenth amendment which would prefer blacks to whites; however, as
the Supreme Court said in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968),
"Does the authority of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment 'by appropriate
legislation' include the power to eliminate all racial barriers to the acquisition of real and
personal property? We think the answer to that question is plainly yes."
The Court cited with approval the statement in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
20 (1883), that § 2 of the thirteenth amendment empowers Congress "to pass all laws
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States." 392
U.S. at 439 (emphasis supplied by the Court). For a recent discussion, see Karst &
Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REv. 955 (1974).
5 We choose beards as an example because we feel that given contemporary male
fashions a beard is a racially neutral characteristic. In Keys v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 357 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Ill. 1973), a black plaintiff alleged a violation of
§ 1981 after he was fired for refusal to shave his sideburns. Plaintiff argued that he, "like
the majority of American males of Negroid-African ancestry, regard[ed] the display of
facial hair growth in the form of . . . long sideburns as traditional symbols of black-
American masculinity." Id. at 377. The court granted summary judgment for the em-
ployer, noting that the plaintiff had been dismissed not because of his race, but rather
because of his personal choice of dress. Id. at 380.
" Although the courts agree that arbitrary treatment based on race is impermissible,
no court has yet recognized a right of non-whites to be free from non-racial arbitrariness.
Two recent § 1981 private school cases are illustrative. In Riley v. Adirondack Southern
School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1976, 5th Cir.,
April 15, 1974, the court held that § 1981 does not prohibit racial discrimination by a
truly private school as long as "other considerations"-albeit arbitrary ones-in addition
to racial discrimination caused plaintiffs' rejection. Id. at 397-98. The court pointed out
that if one can treat whites arbitrarily, then a black has no right to non-arbitrary treat-
ment, for such a result would give blacks greater rights than whites. In Gonzales v.
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"right" would extend far beyond the "right" to be free of arbi-
trariness based on race. This interpretation of section 1982
would require that the landlord treat the bearded black as he or
she would a clean-shaven white.
Reading section 1982 to give non-whites a right to custom-
ary or reasonable treatment limits the ability of people dealing
with non-whites to dispose of their property idiosyncratically.
There is a strong argument against this limitation-namely, that
it is important that people be able to decide with whom they live,
particularly in their own homes.56 A commune may want a potter
or a carpenter. The Smiths may want a tutor or a baby sitter. The
custom or reasonableness interpretation of "same right" might
prohibit a landlord from making these choices when dealing
with non-whites. In addition, it could conceivably limit a com-
mercial developer's freedom to attempt the unusual, at least
when dealing with non-white prospective tenants or purchasers.
An interpretation of section 1982 that sets standards of reason-
ableness for the disposition or rental of real property (albeit only
for non-whites) conflicts with the historically recognized policy of
allowing those possessed of property the freedom to deal with
whomever they please.5 7 This freedom to dispose of property
idiosyncratically may represent a very important value in this
society. Although any economically sophisticated judgments on
issues of this dimension or complexity are beyond the purview of
this Article, it is conceivable that this freedom is a key factor in
helping the housing market to operate at whatever level of effi-
ciency it now attains.
Furthermore, a landlord who lives on the premises may
Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973), affd in relevant part sub
nom. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3054 (U.S. July 10, 1975) (No. 75-62), there was no need to reach this issue,
because the court found that defendants had denied plaintiffs' right to contract because
the plaintiffs were not white, id. at 1203, and that defendants had no criteria other than
race for selecting students, id. at 1204. The court postulated a school that might be all
black or all Chinese or all Jewish and noted that such schools were free to discriminate
against whites, or, indeed, against non-whites if whites were similarly discriminated
against. Id. at n.3. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973).
56 Indeed, this interest is codified in Title VIII's "Ms. Murphy's boarding house"
exemption, which specifically exempts dwellings providing living quarters for no more
than four families. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b)(2) (1970). The exemption is limited to Tide VIII
and does not apply to § 1982. Morris v. Cizek, 503 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir. 1974).
57 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138. For an interesting application of this
principle to race discrimination law, see Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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have a constitutionally protected right of privacy or of associa-
tional freedom which permits wide choice in determining who
will live in his or her dwelling. 58 Although every interpretation
of section 1982 limits the landlord's right to refuse to rent, there
is a difference between governmental interference with that as-
sociational right in order to insure equality of treatment of the
races and interfererice with that right in order to eliminate all
idiosyncratic behavior in dealing with blacks.
Of course, the strong social policy in favor of achieving ra-
cial justice may require measures that go beyond equality of
treatment and begin to move toward assuring equality of
achievement.5 9 Toleration of idiosyncratic rental or sales prac-
tices may permit some landlords to avoid the prohibition against
racial discrimination by selecting another characteristic on which
to base what is, in reality, an illegal refusal.60 But given the
strong competing value in our jurisprudence of freely alienating
property, it seems inappropriate to read section 1982 as prohibit-
ing all non-customary or idiosyncratic behavior in property
transactions with blacks.
D. A Suggested Definition
Interpreting section 1982 to refer to customary or reason-
able treatment creates the danger that the statute may apply too
broadly; reading it as turning on conscious racial motivation
creates the opposite problem. For this reason, we turn to a third
approach, which consists of a two-part test: A non-white is de-
nied the "same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens"
whenever (a) a non-white receives disadvantageous treatment as
compared with the treatment of similarly situated whites by the
18 The possible existence and scope of this constitutionally protected right are
analyzed in three recent notes: Note, supra note 2, at 520-24; Note, Desegregation of Private
Schools: Section 1981 as an Alternative to State Action, 62 GEO. L.J. 1363, 1388-1400 (1974);
Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus Freedom from
Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441 (1975). See also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974).
59 See note 31 supra.
60 We would have to know a great deal more about how much truly arbitrary be-
havior exists in the real estate field before comfortably coming to the conclusion that a
dislike for beards or obesity or extreme height or certain clothing is frequently not a dis-
guise for a dislike for blacks. See, e.g., Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 483 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1973);
Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Cooperative Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972);
Hughes v. Dyer, 378 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Mo. 1974). See also Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d
880 (7th Cir. 1973).
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defendant or by others engaging in transactions similar to the
defendant's, (b) for a reason attributable to race. Sole reliance on
the first part of the test-disadvantageous treatment in fact
-suffers from the same difficulties as the custom test, which we
have shown to be too broad. 61 Applied alone, it would prohibit
all idiosyncratic behavior in property transactions with blacks.
Sole reliance on the mental element-a reason attributable to
race-would free the statute from any requirement of injury in
fact.
Our proposed test asks, "How would people be treated in
the real estate market if this were a race-blind and not a race-
conscious society?" 62 A non-white plaintiff is injured not only
when a defendant consciously takes race into consideration in
determining how to deal with plaintiff; the injury is just as real
and its effects are just as devastating, if the defendant acts for
reasons that are attributable to race, even if the defendant does
not consciously consider them so.
In Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc. ,63 the financing and sales
61 See text accompanying notes 51-60 supra.
62 There is arguably a fourth possibility: the "racially discriminatory effects" test of
such cases as Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 410 U.S. 424 (1971); United States v. City of
BlackJack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 2656 (1975); Hawkins v.
Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc). In our view, the so-called
"effects" test is not a persuasive interpretation of § 1982. Section 1982 applies to purely
private transactions, and the "effects" test has been developed, applied, and apparently
limited to cases dealing with governmental entities and cases involving comprehensive
legislation regulating discrimination in employment (Title VII) and real estate (Tide
VIII). The distinctions between these cases and the typical § 1982 case are important.
First, governmental entities have no privacy or associational interest of the type discussed
above. Moreover, there is no apparent social value in permitting the government to treat
its citizens idiosyncratically-indeed, the judicial development of the equal protection
clause is eloquent testimony to the contrary. Further, with respect to Tides VII and VIII,
Congress has weighed and resolved the competing interests of privacy, freedom to deal
idiosyncratically, and non-discrimination. Whether or not the Court correctly divined the
"true" congressional intent in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, there is no question that
Congress intended to legislate exhaustively in the area of employment discrimination.
The same cannot confidently be said of §§ 1981 and 1982.
Finally, our proposed test does not differ dramatically from the "effects test." As we
shall demonstrate, text accompanying notes 91-132, our test achieves the significant
practical result of the effects test-a shift of the burden of going forward and/or risk of
non-persuasion once plaintiff has proved racially discriminatory impact. The "effects
test" also resembles our test in that the defendant is permitted to justify his or her
conduct. The difference between our test and the "effects test" lies in the kinds of
justifications that are satisfactory. As we have argued above, we believe our test to be
more responsive to the interests affected by § 1982.
63 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974). See text accompanying
notes 25-29 supra.
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practices attributed to the defendants amounted to a "bad deal"
when compared with the arrangements that whites could make
in purchasing similar housing. Universal's houses were more ex-
pensive than comparable white housing. Universal's terms were
worse than those that whites could secure-normally a long-term
conditional sales contract as opposed to a transfer of title subject
to a mortgage. The blacks dealing with Universal got less for
more; they had to spend more capital and income than whites
spent for comparable housing. Universal offered the kind of
deal that no one with free choice would make, and the segre-
gated housing market in Chicago severely restricted plaintiffs'
freedom of choice. Thus, Universal's opportunity to deal with
the plaintiffs on disadvantageous terms was directly attributable
to the plaintiffs' non-white race.
In Clark the Seventh Circuit held that these facts established
a prima facie case under what it termed the "exploitation theory
of liability" of section 1982. Although that phrase nicely de-
scribes the conduct of Universal Builders, it is not sufficiently
general to do justice to the purposes of section 1982. Suppose
that a black tries to rent an apartment in an all-white building
and is refused on the ground that apartments are rented only to
people who know the present tenants. Suppose further that the
policy is applied to both blacks and whites alike, and that present
tenants either do not know or do not recommend blacks, so that
some whites but no blacks can get apartments. This is not exploi-
tation as defined in Clark because there is no proof of a segre-
gated market which the defendant exploited. Yet the policy
clearly has a greater impact on blacks than on whites.
64
Moreover, a policy of dealing only with relatives or friends is a
traditional means of perpetuating racial exclusivity. 65 In most
cases, it has little purpose beyond maintaining exclusivity. In our
view, this is a "reason attributable to race" and within the prohi-
bition of section 1982.
64 Cf Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Pike Corp.
of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F.
Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modified, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). See also Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
65 For contemporary examples, see the practices employed by the defendants in
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d
1333 (2d Cir. 1974); Local 53, Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.
1969).
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We define a reason attributable to race as one based on a
policy that, when applied to the given transaction, (a) is likely to
have a greater adverse effect on blacks than on whites; and (b)
is likely to have such an effect because: (1) the policy is a product
of, or reflects,66 the long history of discrimination against non-
whites; or (2) the history of discrimination has left blacks more
vulnerable than whites;67 or (3) the policy evinces an individual's
personal reaction to blacks;68 unless6 9 (c) the reason serves an
important business7 ° purpose (other than whatever advantages
flow from disadvantageous treatment of non-whites).7 ' This def-
inition fits the language and purpose of section 1982, and pro-
vides a workable standard for litigating private housing discrim-
ination cases.7 2 Although this approach to "same right" clearly
covers the policies in Clark and the "rent on recommendation"
policy described above, it would not cover our previous case of
the bearded black who is refused housing on the ground that
the landlord dislikes beards, if the factfinder believes that rea-
son. This is because it would probably be impossible to convince
a judge both (a) that the policy is likely to affect blacks more ad-
versely than whites and (b) that if there is a differential effect,
66 E.g., a policy of renting only to friends and relatives of existing tenants.
67 E.g., Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1070 (1974).
68 Thus phrased, our definition subsumes consciously racially motivated treatment,
which, of course, is the most obvious reason attributable to race.
69 We suggest that part (c) of our definition be treated as an affirmative defense for
the following reasons: (1) before reaching part (c), the plaintiff has already had to
convince the judge, see note 74 infra, of disadvantageous treatment and of a nexus be-
tween that treatment and plaintiff's blackness, thereby placing himself or herself within
the class of citizens that the statute was passed to protect; (2) it is difficult to prove a
negative; (3) it is the defendant who knows which, if any, business purpose is relied upon,
and why it is "important"; and (4) the defendant's answer will instruct the plaintiff
whether to conduct discovery of purported business reasons.
70 The term "business" covers both obvious business reasons, such as a security de-
posit or a down payment, and more subtle reasons, such as a private landlord's desiring a
babysitter or tutor. Babysitters and tutors cost money.
71 Our definition is intended to exclude the justification that unfavorable treatment
of blacks is "good business," either because it keeps whites happy, cf. Williams v. Mat-
thews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974); Roberts v. St.
Louis Southwestern Ry., 329 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Ark. 1971), or because it is profit maxi-
mizing, Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1070 (1974). For a similar result under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970), see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The
cases under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970), are
in accord. See, e.g., United States v. Reddoch, 467 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972).
72 See text accompanying notes 91-132 infra.
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the difference is a product of, or reflects, the long history of race
discrimination, or manifests the defendant's personal reaction
to blacks.
As the "reason attributable to race" part of our approach
turns on the reasons for the defendant's conduct, it resembles
the defendant-oriented test in that the defendant's motivation is
relevant.7 3 We still must give the defendant a chance to explain
why he or she treated the non-white as he or she did, because
the reason may not be attributable to race-for example, the
black plaintiff may have been unemployed and unable to pay the
rent. It differs from the defendant-oriented test, however, in an
extremely important respect. Under the defendant-oriented test,
defendant's liability turns on his or her subjective feelings about
race. Under our proposed test, although the defendant's reasons
for acting are still essential, the legality of those reasons is mea-
sured by an objective test-namely, whether those reasons are
attributable to race.
7 4
The other part of our approach-disadvantageous treat-
ment-is both broader and narrower than the test of custom-
ary or reasonable treatment. It is broader because it measures
a defendant's treatment of blacks both against how the defen-
73 This does not mean, however, that the plaintiffs must adduce direct evidence of
defendant's mental processes to prevail on this issue. Inferences and presumptions are
available to bridge the gap between proof of the defendant's behavior and the
factfinder's conclusion about the reason for that behavior.
74 By "objective test," we mean that the defendant's reason for acting in a particular
manner can be attributable to race even though the defendant does not subjectively have
racial motivation. This objective test, however, obviously also covers cases of subjective
racial motivation, for if defendant's treatment of a black plaintiff is actually racially
motivated, the treatment is inherently attributable to race. Whether a reason is one
attributable to race is a question of law for the judge to determine. This approach is
consistent with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In that case
plaintiff had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination in employment in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 20 0 0e et seq. (1970).
The Court held that, if believed, the defendant's explanation for refusing to rehire
plaintiff-that he had engaged in unlawful activity designed to disrupt defendant's
business-was sufficient to defeat plaintiff's prima facie case. Thus, while the question
whether defendant's explanation is believable is a question of fact, the legal sufficiency of
the explanation is a question of law. This approach permits consistent decisionmaking
and provides clear guidance with respect to a private party's obligations under the civil
rights laws. Moreover, plaintiffs would face an onerous problem of proof if required to
introduce evidence as to each element of a reason attributable to race, particularly be-
cause in most cases plaintiff's proof on this point might have to await defendant's tes-
timony as to his reasons for treating plaintiff disadvantageously. Consequently, in a jury
case, the court should instruct the jury which reasons are attributable to race, leaving to
the jury the task of determining whether defendant in fact acted for a forbidden reason.
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dant does or would treat whites, and against how others engag-
ing in similar transactions treat whites. It is narrower in that it
avoids most of the preferential treatment problems of the cus-
tom or reasonable treatment test.
7 5
The most substantial problem with the "attributable to race"
approach is defining the limits of the doctrine. Given the dis-
tribution of wealth and income in our society, a rent of $400 a
month affects blacks more harshly than whites. It is arguable
that racial discrimination has been a substantial factor in produc-
ing this state of affairs; yet it is impossible to read section 1982 as
requiring those dealing in the real estate market to ignore either
available capital or income stream in deciding whether and on
what terms to deal with someone.76 Even if the thirteenth
75 It avoids only "most" of the problems because it is possible that a landlord or seller
will insist on maintaining an exclusionary policy even when that policy cannot be applied
to non-whites; thus, it is theoretically possible that in order to comply with § 1982, a
landlord might continue to exclude whites who are not recommended by present tenants
but not blacks who are similarly unrecommended. Whatever constitutional difficulties
there may be in preferential treatment that results from enjoining idiosyncratic real
estate practices, there is no doubt about a court's power under the civil rights laws to
enjoin a practice that it finds to be attributable to race. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974);
Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854
(1971).
Moreover, it is arguable that, whatever the definition of "same right" in § 1982, the
statute "prefers" non-whites in the sense that a non-white has a more straightforward
right to recover for violation of the statute. For example, if whites bought homes in the
black ghetto from Universal Builders they would allegedly have purchased on the same
terms as the black buyers, Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974). See text accompanying notes 22-29, 44-45, 63-64 supra. If
the right of those whites to bring an action under § 1982 exists at all, however, it may
only be a derivative right. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229
(1969). But cf. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
76 In Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975), the Second Circuit found
that neither § 1982 nor Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19
(1970), prohibited the defendant from requiring that a prospective tenant have a weekly
income equal to a fixed percentage of the monthly rental of the desired apartment
despite a showing that this requirement excluded welfare recipients, a group which was
over three-quarters black or Spanish-surnamed. The majority reasoned that § 1982 and
Tide VIII prohibited only racially motivated disadvantageous treatment of non-whites,
and that defendant's practice did not spring from such motivation.
As we have argued, text accompanying notes 30-48 supra, the Second Circuit's in-
terpretation of § 1982 does not do justice to the language or purpose of the statute.
Assuming that landlords do not typically impose percentage requirements on white per-
sons with an income comparable to the plaintiff's in Lefrak (thus satisfying the injury
requirement of § 1982), liability should turn on the reasons for this policy. Although
Lefrak's policy cannot be held to violate § 1982 simply because it has a disadvantageous
impact on minorities-a rent of $250 a month also has such an impact-neither is it valid
simply because the district court (justice Clark, sitting by designation) was unwilling to
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amendment permitted Congress to do so, the language of sec-
tion 1982 is not susceptible of such a reading.77 Nor is it conceiv-
able that Congress intended the statute so to be read. The only
satisfactory resolution is that suggested by the Supreme Court in
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,78 that the statute means that a dollar
in the hands of a black can purchase the same thing as a dollar in
the hands of a white, but was not intended to force private
persons to compensate for differences in ability to acquire capital
or generate income. It is for this reason that we limit the "at-
tributable to race" test to those situations in which the policy
does not serve an important business purpose (other than the
business advantages flowing from disadvantageous treatment of
non-whites) .7
E. Mental Elements of a Prima Facie Case
Defining "same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens" to
prohibit disadvantageous treatment for reasons attributable to
race supplies three elements of plaintiff's prima facie case: (a)
the prohibited act or omission (defendant's treatment of
plaintiff); (b) the injury or harm (disadvantageous treatment);
make what it considered to be an unnecessary finding of racial motivation. Boyd v.
Lefrak, P-H EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 13650 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). Rather, if the
policy affects a predominantly black class unfavorably as compared with similarly situated
whites, the validity of the defendant's action should turn on the reasons for the
defendant's requirement. If Lefrak had been able to convince the factfinder that dealing
with welfare recipients created substantial cash flow problems or produced a markedly
higher rate of defaults and that this was the reason for its policy, then Lefrak should
have prevailed.
7 Whites have no "right"-whether based on custom or reasonableness or any other
source-to a particular type of housing regardless of ability to pay a lawfully set price for
it. By definition, therefore, § 1982 does not grant such a "right" to non-whites.
78 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
79 A somewhat analogous problem arises in construing the "bona fide occupational
qualification" exception in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e) (1970). See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Wilson v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 686
(D.D.C. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Courts have not
completely resolved the question whether a loss of profit can be a defense to an alleged
violation of Title VII. Cf. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971);
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). Our definition is
designed to make clear that loss of business advantage attributable to race is no defense
to a § 1982 action. For instance, under our definition if a landlord charges a higher rent
in a black neighborhood than is normally charged for comparable housing in a white
neighborhood, he or she does not violate § 1982 if his legitimate expenses (e.g., heat) are
commensurately higher. If the landlord makes higher profits in the black neighborhood
as a result of a captive black population, however, this is a business advantage flowing
from disadvantageous treatment of non-whites.
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and (c) the mental state (that defendant was motivated by a
reason attributable to race). There is, however, an additional
state of mind issue that must be resolved in order to define
precisely the mental element of a prima facie case under section
1982. This is the question whether the failure to deal which
caused"0 plaintiff's injury must be shown to have been inten-
tional. Consider two examples. In the first, the plaintiff seeks to
rent an apartment and the landlord refuses. Suit is filed and the
landlord testifies that he or she meant to say no to the plaintiff,
and explains why he or she refused the rental. In the second,
plaintiff seeks to rent an apartment and is told by the landlord,
"I will let you know tomorrow." The plaintiff does not hear the
next day, and when plaintiff calls to find out what happened, the
landlord says that the apartment has been rented. Suit is filed,
and the landlord testifies (and the factfinder believes) that al-
though the landlord had intended to rent to plaintiff, he or she
forgot to call plaintiff the next day and, in the interim, the
landlord's agent rented the apartment to another.
In the first example, the landlord intended not to rent the
apartment. In the second example, the landlord intended to rent
the apartment but negligently failed to carry out that intention.
80 Although a full discussion of the issue is beyond the scope of this Article, liability
under the statute necessarily also depends on finding that the defendant was the "legal
cause" of the plaintiff's injury. Typically, this is not a difficult issue. The plaintiff has
sought to engage in a property transaction with the defendant, and the defendant has
rebuffed plaintiff. Plaintiff identifies the rebuff as the injury (the denial of the "same
right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens"), and the case typically turns on the reasons for
the defendant's action.
Suppose, however, that the defendant does not rebuff the plaintiff, but deals with
him or her on the same basis as the defendant does or would deal with whites. Suppose
further that it can be demonstrated that the terms on which the landlord does deal are
substantially worse than the terms on which whites can typically either rent or purchase
comparable real estate. Although this would be an injury under the broad definition of
§ 1982, can it fairly be said that the defendant "caused" the injury rather than that the
plaintiff "caused" his or her own injury by failing to look harder for a better deal? The
answer to this question may turn on the opportunities enjoyed by plaintiffs to secure
housing on other terms from other sellers or lessors. Thus, in Clark v. Universal Builders,
Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974), the Seventh Circuit held
that plaintiffs had established a prima facie violation of § 1982 when, in addition to
demonstrating injury in the broad sense, they established the existence of a dual hous-
ing market which sharply reduced their options as to where and from whom they
could buy.
Here, as elsewhere in the law, the determination whether the defendant's action was
the "legal cause" of the plaintiff's injury will depend on the policies underlying the
substantive law, the nature and character of the defendant's act, and our commonly
shared notions of what is 'just."
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If section 1982 is interpreted to apply only to those whose acts
reflect their intention, then the landlord may be liable in the first
example but cannot be liable in the second. If, however, section
1982 requires no particular state of mind accompanying the act
of refusal, or only a negligent failure to rent, then it is possible
that the landlord would be liable in either example.
Section 1982 should not impose liability on those who inad-
vertently or negligently do the act or omit to do the act that
allegedly injures plaintiff. Liability under section 1982 should
ultimately depend on the reasons why the defendant acted or
omitted to act. The kinds of reasons that section 1982 invalidates
are those that are attributable to the plaintiff's non-white race. A
truly inadvertent or negligent 8' action or inaction is not so at-
tributable. 82 If the factfinder can determine the reason for
defendant's conduct-for example, a refusal to rent because
plaintiff had an Afro hairstyle-then the factfinder has necessar-
ily found that the injurious act was intentional in the threshold
81 If the factfinder determines that an individual was negligent or acted inadver-
tently, that is legally the end of the matter. Although it may make psychological sense to
go further-to inquire why the defendant was negligent-the law does not carry the
inquiry this far. The legal factfinding process is an awkward mechanism for answering
such questions, and we have no adequate jurisprudence other than the insanity defense
for dealing with non-conscious motivation. But see Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d
1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc), in which the court said, "[T]he facts before us
squarely and certainly support the reasonable and logical inference that there was here
neglect involving clear overtones of racial discrimination...."Judge Wisdom, concurring,
characterized this statement as "ambiguous." Id. at 1174. In our view it is illogical, and
most likely reflects the uneasy tension between the Fifth Circuit's own reading of the
record and its willingness to reverse a district court's finding as to motivation.
82 It is arguable that there is yet another state of mind issue. This would be whether,
assuming that the disadvantageous treatment need not be consciously motivated by racial
considerations, the defendant nonetheless must have been aware that the challenged
policy results in disadvantageous treatment of blacks for a reason attributable to race.
Returning to the landlord who only rents to people recommended by present tenants,
suppose the factfinder believes that the landlord neither employed the policy to exclude
blacks nor was aware that this would be the result of the policy. Should this exculpate the
landlord?
The issue is whether a "pure heart but an empty head" should be a defense to a
§ 1982 action. We believe that it should not. First, there is nothing either in the language
or purpose of the statute or in the case law that suggests that "awareness" is a require-
ment under § 1982. Second, it is a false issue at least with respect to prospective relief.
Once plaintiff has been rebuffed, complains, and sues, the defendant will be made aware
of the effects of his or her policy and will have opportunity to alter them without
awaiting trial. Finally, the difference between motivation and awareness is quite subtle,
and may well be beyond the grasp of factfinders. Requiring proof of "awareness" would
be reintroducing the problems associated with demanding proof of conscious racial moti-
vation.
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sense we are discussing. Consequently, the question whether de-
fendant intended the act is not a separate element of the prima
facie case.
There is a final issue concerning the meaning of "reasons
attributable to race." Suppose that the defendant testifies and
the factfinder believes that a reason attributable to race was a
factor in the defendant's decision to act or not to act, but that it
was not the only factor in that decision . 3 What test should a
court apply in determining whether there has been a violation
of the statute?
In one sense this is a causation issue, but it is not the typical
causation issue whether the defendant's act or omission was the
legal cause of the plaintiff's injury.84 The question here is differ-
ent: whether the reason attributable to race should be con-
sidered a reason for the defendant's act or omission. Of the
traditional tests of causation, the one that meets both the lan-
guage and policy of section 1982 is the contributing factor test.
85
The meaning of the statute is that private parties must treat
non-whites as whites are treated in property transactions. By
definition, a private party does not do so when he or she takes a
reason attributable to race into account, even if that reason is not
the sole factor behind the refusal to deal. As one court which
reversed the lower court's application of a "but for" test has
noted, there is "no acceptable place in the law for partial racial
discrimination."
86
Under this approach, the case of a defendant who acted for
both permissible and impermissible reasons is not difficult to
resolve. For example, if the defendant refused even to consider
the plaintiff's offer to deal for a prohibited reason, there is a
violation of section 1982. Proof that the defendant ultimately
would have refused to conclude a transaction with the plaintiff
because of some disqualifying reason not attributable to race
may be relevant to the type and amount of harm suffered by
83 See, e.g., Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974);
Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970); Hughes v. Dyer, 378 F.
Supp. 1305 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
84 See note 80 supra.
85 Our suggestion is consistent with the approach of the Seventh Circuit in Smith v.
Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1970).
81 Id. at 350.
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plaintiff, and to the type of relief that a court will grant,87 but is
not controlling on the issue whether the statute has been vio-
lated.
F. Summary: Elements of the Prima Facie Case
To summarize the discussion to this point, the words "same
right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens" contained in section
1982 grant to non-white citizens88 freedom from any disadvan-
tageous treatment for a reason attributable to race. Disadvan-
tageous treatment means either treatment less favorable than the
defendant does or would grant to similarly situated whites, or
treatment less favorable than others engaged in transactions
similar to the defendant's typically accord such whites. "Reason
attributable to race" means that the reason for the disadvanta-
geous treatment is one based on a policy that, when applied to
the given transaction, (a) is likely to have a greater adverse effect
on blacks than on whites; and (b) is likely to have such an effect
because: (1) the policy is a product of, or reflects, the long his-
tory of discrimination against non-whites; or (2) the history of
discrimination has left blacks more vulnerable than whites; or (3)
the policy evinces an individual's personal reaction to blacks;
unless (c) the reason serves an important business purpose (other
than whatever advantages flow from disadvantageous treatment
of non-whites).
This definition supplies both the prohibited act and the in-
jury under section 1982. It also indicates the requisite mental
element: that a reason attributable to race was a contributing
factor in the defendant's refusal to deal with the plaintiff. In
addition to these elements-supplied by the definition of "same
right"-plaintiff must also establish that defendant's act or omis-
sion was the legal cause of plaintiff's injury.8 9
87 In this regard consider the (admittedly unlikely) case of a black pyromaniac who is
refused rental housing by a self-proclaimed racist landlord. Under our approach to the
problem, proof that race was a factor in the landlord's refusal to deal would arguably
support a money judgment for the plaintiff. It would not, however, require the court to
order the defendant to rent to the plaintiff. The only "right" denied the plaintiff was the
"right" to have the rental decision made without consideration of the plaintiff's race; a
violation of this "right" may result in punitive damages, but it does not, by itself, require
the landlord to rent to the plaintiff.
88 Because the statute grants a right to "citizens," the plaintiff is also required to
establish his or her citizenship.
89 For a brief discussion of the causation element of a prima facie case, see note 80
supra.
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II. PROOF OF SECTION 1982 VIOLATIONS
In this section we shall first discuss proof of the injury and
state of mind elements of the prima facie case. In particular, we
shall analyze the inferences that the factfinder appropriately
may draw in order to establish that case. We shall then discuss
the treatment of defendant's response to the prima facie case,
concentrating on the role of presumptions in shifting the burden
of going forward, the burden of persuasion, or both. We have
two goals: to demonstrate that our definition of "same right"
provides a workable framework within which to litigate and re-
solve section 1982 disputes, and to indicate the inferences and
presumptions that should be employed in determining the sig-
nificance of evidence in cases involving allegations of racial dis-
crimination.
The concept of a prima facie case is fundamental to our
jurisprudence. Plaintiff has introduced evidence of a prima facie
case when there is sufficient evidence to permit a factfinder
reasonably to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
plaintiff has established the existence of each element of his or
her claim for relief.90 Under section 1982, a prima facie case
means that there is sufficient evidence to permit a factfinder
reasonably to conclude that (a) defendant's conduct (b) caused
(c) plaintiff to be treated less advantageously than similarly
situated whites are or would be treated by defendant or by peo-
ple engaged in transactions similar to defendant's, and (d) that
defendant acted for a reason attributable to race. The remainder
of this discussion will concentrate on elements (c) and (d) above,
the elements most directly derived from our definition of "same
right."
A. Permissible Inferences
Evidence constituting a prima facie case with respect to ele-
ment (c) above, injury, also constitutes a prima facie case with
respect to element (d), state of mind. Proof that a defendant has
treated a non-white worse than he or she (or others engaging in
similar transactions) treats or would treat similarly situated
whites permits the factfinder to draw the inference that the dif-
ference in treatment is attributable to race. The converse is also
true: Evidence constituting a prima facie case with respect to
90 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1353 (4th ed. 1968).
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state of mind also constitutes a prima facie case with respect to
injury. Proof that a defendant acted pursuant to a reason at-
tributable to race permits the factfinder to draw the inference
that the conduct predicated upon that state of mind would man-
ifest itself in terms of racially disparate treatment.
The relationship between proof of state of mind and injury
is most obvious in simple cases. In Harris v. Jones,91 Harris, a
black, went to an advertised apartment on the second floor of
Jones' home. She indicated her desire to rent the apartment for
her husband and herself (they had no children), but was refused
on the ground that the lessors were looking for an older couple
who could make a longer time commitment than the one year to
which plaintiff would commit herself. The next day, a tester 92-a
twenty-seven-year-old white graduate student with long hair and
a droopy mustache-went to the Jones' home, was shown the
apartment, and tendered a ten dollar deposit. The tester indi-
cated that he was married but childless and was in a three- or
four-year program. He was not asked to make a commitment for
longer than one year. Although Jones was present in court, she
did not testify and offered no reasons for refusing Harris and
accepting the tester.
From these facts, the court in Harris v. Jones found a viola-
tion of section 1982; there was sufficient evidence with respect to
each element of the claim for relief to constitute a prima facie
case, and the evidence was believed. What supported that find-
ing? Why is it not as likely that the Joneses simply changed their
minds about the qualities they were looking for in a tenant, or
that they took a strong liking to the tester and decided that they
wanted to rent to him and his wife even though they were no
older than the Harrises, or that they thought that a person of his
education would enrich their lives? Perhaps the landlords dis-
liked Harris but did not want to hurt her feelings, and so told
gentle lies to explain their refusal. If Harris had been white
instead of black, any of these suggested explanations would have
been believable. In deciding Harris v. Jones, the court necessarily
made certain assumptions about human behavior. The court
must have assumed that the defendants were conscious of and
reacted unfavorably to the plaintiff's race instead of any other
91 296 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Mass. 1969).
92 See note 17 supra.
[Vol. 124:1
SECTION 1982 CASES
feature about her. Because there was no evidence about the de-
fendants' personalities and views, the court must have based this
assumption on its view of how people generally, or landlords
specifically, react to blacks. The court's willingness to draw the
inference that defendants reacted unfavorably to Harris' race
also permitted it to conclude that the defendants would have
treated Harris differently had she been white, thereby establish-
ing the injury element of the prima facie case.
Although the conclusion that racial prejudice is pervasive in
our society, particularly in the real estate market, is hardly
novel, 93 a court's willingness to employ that perception in draw-
ing inferences to explain behavior is noteworthy. After all, infer-
ences are predicated upon the way people normally behave.
Here a court is suggesting that, given the facts of Harris, the
normal motivation for a refusal to rent would be racial prej-
udice. This is hardly a "color-blind" inference. It presents a gen-
erally unkind assumption about how people behave. Indeed, it
suggests that it would be error to instruct the factfinder other-
wise, namely, that in resolving the case, it is to assume that peo-
ple behave in a non-discriminatory manner in real estate deal-
ings, absent proof to the contrary.
94
The reasoning process employed by the court in Harris v.
Jones is not unusual. Facts similar to those of Harris have been
held to constitute a prima facie case even under the defendant-
oriented view of section 1982. 95 Moreover, the Supreme Court's
definition of a prima facie case under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196496 parallels the simple "tester"97 case under
9' See note 39 supra.
94 Cf. United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438, 443-44 (5th Cir. 1973),'cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Fessler & Haar, Beyond the Wrong Side of the Tracks: Municipal
Services in the Interstices of Procedure, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LiB. L. REv. 441, 448
(1971).
95 See, e.g., Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 336 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1070 (1974); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1021 (1974); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974); Jennings v.
Patterson, 488 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1974); Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 483 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.
1973); Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1973); Hall v. Freitas, 343 F. Supp.
1099 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146
(N.D. Ill. 1972); Martin v. John C. Bowers & Co., 334 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Brown
v. Balas, 331 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1971); Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151 (N.D.
Ohio 1969); Newbern v. Lake Lorelei, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Ohio 1968). Cf.
Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974).
96 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970).
'7 Note 17 supra.
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section 1982. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,98 the Supreme
Court described a prima facie violation of Title VII as including
the following evidence about the plaintiff:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he ap-
plied and was qualified for ajob for which the employer
was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifica-
tions, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer con-
tinued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.99
Although Green did not involve a tester, the plaintiff proved
the functional equivalent of what a tester would have proved
-that the employer continued to look for someone with
plaintiff's qualifications after having rejected the plaintiff. Simi-
larly, in a section 1982 case, defendant's advertising for a tenant
or purchaser of plaintiff's qualifications after refusing plaintiff
permits the inference that plaintiff was refused for reasons at-
tributable to race. There is no magic in a tester. The function of
a tester is to facilitate proof that defendant refused plaintiff for
reasons attributable to race and that defendant would have
treated a white differently from the way in which he or she
treated plaintiff.100
Suppose, however, there is a case in which a tester (or the
equivalent) is irrelevant because defendant does not refuse to
deal with plaintiff, as in Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc. 0 1 In that
case, plaintiffs introduced evidence establishing that the defen-
dants sold houses to them on terms less favorable than the terms
on which a white person with the same resources could purchase
comparable housing elsewhere in the Chicago area.'0 2 As we
98 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
99 Id. at 802. As the Court observed in a footnote, "The facts necessarily will vary in
Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from
respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations."
Id. at n.13.
"' Indeed, there is no magic in any particular type of proof despite the tendency of
some courts to confuse evidence relevant to a legal test with the test itself. See note 25
supra. Cf. Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 827-28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1021 (1974). Courts do so, we suggest, because insufficient attention has been paid to
precise definitions of the applicable legal rule.
101 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974).
102 Plaintiffs also introduced evidence of a segregated housing market, thus dem-
onstrating that their actual options in purchasing housing were limited. Indeed, the
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have previously demonstrated, 10 3 this proves injury under sec-
tion 1982. The same evidence also supports the inference that
the injury is attributable to race. Because courts proceed on the
assumption that people react unfavorably to race, 10 4 facts that
support no inference as to motivation if plaintiff is white ("I
didn't get the apartment for which I was fully qualified") do
support an inference of a reason attributable to race if plaintiff is
black. In Clark, even assuming that the defendants did not treat
blacks and whites differently, the defendants did behave in an
unusual manner toward blacks to their disadvantage. Whatever
the explanation for defendants' behavior had their customers
been white, the combination of unusual and disadvantageous
treatment of an almost exclusively black population permits the
inference that the unusual and disadvantageous treatment of
blacks was attributable to their race.
Moreover, although we reject conscious racial motivation as
the exclusive mental element that will result in liability under
section 1982, it should be noted that evidence sufficient to sup-
port the inference of a reason attributable to race arguably sup-
ports the inference of racial motivation. The difference between
the two mental states (racial motivation versus a reason attribut-
able to race) turns on such matters as whether the defendant
appreciated the effects of his or her conduct and whether the
defendant desired those effects. This is not to suggest that the
line between our approach and the traditional one with respect
to mental state is irrelevant to the actual resolution of section
1982 cases; the distinction is very important with respect to a
court's treatment of defendant's explanation once plaintiff has
established a prima facie case.
Even under our analysis, plaintiff will not have an easy task
establishing a prima facie case in those situations in which a
tester or its equivalent is either unavailable or irrelevant. Plain-
tiffs must adduce evidence of comparable transactions and of the
Seventh Circuit found reversible error in the district court's refusal to admit evidence
tending to show that plaintiffs were unable to purchase homes in the surrounding
(primarily all-white) suburbs of Chicago.
103 See text accompanying notes 25-27, 38-42 supra.
104 Harris v. Jones, 296 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Mass. 1969); see text accompanying notes
91-94 supra.
There may, of course, be other reasonable explanations for defendant's treatment of
plaintiff. The factfinder does not have to conclude that the treatment was attributable to
race, but, rather, is only permitted to do so. This is the function of an inference.
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personal characteristics that are considered by people who en-
gage in such transactions. Plaintiff must then offer evidence of
what happens to whites who possess similar characteristics in
such transactions. The relevant characteristics will vary with the
transaction. A person selling a residence will typically consider
the sales price and the ability of the buyer to make the down
payment and to secure mortgage financing. While a lessor will
consider the rental figure, he or she will also be concerned about
the tenant's reliability and timeliness in making payments, as well
as about how the tenant will treat the leased premises, and
whether the tenant's behavior will interfere with other tenants or
occupants of the dwelling. A builder-financer-seller such as Uni-
versal Builders will be.interested in the normal concerns of both
sellers and lenders. Capital, income stream, and ability and wil-
lingness to maintain the property are all relevant concerns of
such enterprises. Identifying all those matters as to which evi-
dence is needed may be less than half the battle; securing that
evidence will often be difficult. These problems in the proof
process should calm any fear that our suggested approach will
unjustifiably "open the floodgates" of litigation.105
105 Consider what should be a simple case. A black is refused rental in a two-
hundred-unit apartment house and the landlord offers no reasons therefor. The pros-
pective black tenant wishes to prove that landlords customarily rent to white people who
are "like" him or her-that such whites have an option here that has been denied to the
plaintiff. But what does it mean for one tenant to be "like" other acceptable tenants?
Must the refused tenant prove similar age, income, prior rental record, marital status,
credit history and financial position? Must he or she prove compliance with such formal
lease convenants (which, more often than not, are honored only in the breach) as number
of children, existence of pets, or willingness to turn off the television at 11:00 p.m.?
What about the more informal aspects of the landlord-tenant relationship, such as
willingness to sign a three-year lease, to cheat on rent control, to avoid loud parties, and
to wait another year before demanding fresh paint? Obviously, the list can exhaust the
litigant's time and financial resources.
Suppose, however, that it is possible to agree on the terms that comprise the list. The
rejected tenant must then ascertain the typical behavior of a landlord with respect to each
item. Behavioral disparities abound. Relevancy problems become critical. If landlords in
Austin, Texas, require a one-year lease and no security deposit, is that relevant to deter-
mining whether a landlord in San Francisco, California, behaved in a customary fashion
in requiring a three-year lease? Indeed, is it relevant that inner city landlords may not
require wall-to-wall carpeting when evaluating a suburban landlord's requirement that
such carpeting be installed? Rental units may differ widely according to locality, type of
construction, requirements of state and local building codes, climate, type of manage-
ment, size, age and design of buildings, use of property (residential, commercial, or
industrial), and the interest of the landlord (personal residence, investment, tax shelter).
These problems may inevitably force litigants pursuing this road to use expert tes-
timony, thus increasing both the cost and the complexity of litigation. Plaintiffs may find
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To summarize, a plaintiff has established a prima facie case
under section 1982 when he or she introduces credible evidence
of the following: (a) that the plaintiff is a non-white citizen; (b)
that plaintiff has attempted to engage in a property transaction
with the defendant at a time when the defendant is willing to
engage in such a transaction; and (c) either (i) that the defendant
has treated the plaintiff less well than similarly situated white
persons are normally treated in comparable property transac-
tions, or (ii) that the defendant has treated the plaintiff less well
than the defendant would treat, currently treats, or has previ-
ously treated similarly situated whites. Plaintiff need not intro-
duce direct evidence of mental state because of the logical infer-
ence that flows from proof of injury ((c) (i) or (ii) above).
While those cases that describe the elements of a prima facie
case under section 1982 do so in terms different from those we
have set out above, 10 6 the actual resolution of the cases is consis-
tent with our formulation. 07
B. Treatment of Defendant's Explanation
The preceding discussion related to the evidence that per-
mits a factfinder to draw inferences in order to conclude that
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of discrimination. This
it far easier to produce out-of-town experts on real estate practices than to rely on local
real estate people, who have to deal continually with the landlords. Yet an out-of-town
expert's lack of familiarity with the conditions about which he or she is being called to
testify might be a bar to his or her being qualified. Even if the expert has been qualified,
his or her lack of knowledge of local conditions might well make the expert's testimony
less probative in the eyes of the factfinder.
106 Cases cited note 95 supra.
107 In Love v. DeCarlo Homes, Inc., 482 F.2d 613 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1115 (1973), the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie
case because they had failed to show that similarly situated whites could purchase com-
parable housing on more favorable terms elsewhere. This decision is not inconsistent
with our analysis although the court's emphasis on the necessity of showing "comparable"
housing is probably misplaced. Suppose that the policies employed by the defendants in
Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070
(1974), had been carried to such extremes that, as a result, the houses in the black market
were so poorly constructed as to have no equal in the non-segregated market. Would the
impossibility of finding "comparable" housing mean that buyers in the black market
could have no remedy under § 1982? Suppose that plaintiffs adduced evidence that the
profit margin in the industry did not vary significantly with the sales price and that the
profit margin for the sale of houses in the black market greatly exceeded that for other
sales. Would such evidence not render the "comparability" issue irrelevant? Indeed,
although the court's opinion is not as clear as one might wish on this point, it appears
that the plaintiffs in Clark attempted to do precisely this. 501 F.2d at 337-39.
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evidence, even if unanswered, would not necessarily compel that
conclusion; moreover, the defendant still has available the de-
fense of a non-racial reason for his or her conduct. The next
question is whether the evidence sufficient for a prima facie case
also supports some kind of presumption regarding the defen-
dant's reasons for acting in the manner complained of.'0 8
At a minimum, the effect of a presumption is to say, 'Tact-
finder, if you believe the evidence the plaintiff has introduced of
the triggering facts ((a), (b), and (c)(i) or (ii) above), then you
must find the presumed fact (a reason attributable to race) unless
the defendant comes forward with evidence of an acceptable
reason for his or her conduct. 10 9
Considerations that have traditionally led courts to employ
presumptions all favor the use of a presumption in section 1982
cases: The presumed fact (a reason attributable to race) is usually
or normally present where the triggering facts are found; the
most relevant evidence is typically within the defendant's knowl-
edge or control;" 0 the presumed fact (a reason attributable to
race) is difficult to prove because of the multiplicity of potential
explanations and the possibility of "after the fact" creation; and
important social policies favor the presumption."' The Supreme
Court has recognized that the strong social policy against racial
discrimination justifies the use of a presumption in a suit
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,112 and
108 As we have noted earlier, note 74 supra, the question whether a particular reason
is "attributable to race" is one of law for the court.
109 See McCoRMIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 342 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972).
110 It has been suggested that in view of the development of more flexible rules of
discovery this consideration is not especially significant. 88 HARV. L. REV. 1610, 1618
(1975). But this ignores the fact that the issue to be determined is the defendant's state of
mind, and that state of mind is difficult to determine accurately, whether by discovery
or by cross-examination at trial. It is for this reason that presumptions and inferences
are employed. In any event, it seems clear that the dominant consideration is the ju-
dicial assessment of the probability that the fact to be inferred actually occurred. Cf.
McCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 337, at 787 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
"'See, e.g., F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 259-66 (1965); Subrin, Presumptions and Their
Treatment Under the Law of Ohio, 26 OHIo ST. L.J. 175, 181-92 (1965).
112 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Supreme Court in
Green enumerated the elements of a prima facie case under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970), and then stated that upon proof of a prima
facie case, "[tlhe burden must then shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 411 U.S. at 802. Thus, Green
stands for the proposition that proof of a prima facie case raises a presumption that race
was a factor in the defendant's conduct.
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decisions under section 1982 are in accord. 113
The harder question is what happens to the presumption
when the defendant adduces evidence that he or she acted for a
reason that is not "attributable to race." There are three general
kinds of possibilities.1
4
The first is that the presumption disappears, and there is no
inference. This means that once evidence of a non-racial reason
is introduced, the presumption disappears, and because there is
no inference, the plaintiff is left without a prima facie case.
Given our argument that there is an inference, and given the
important reasons for both the inference and the presumption,
this approach makes little sense.
The next possibility is that the defendant's evidence makes
the presumption disappear, but the inference remains. The fact-
finder is left to choose between the inference and the defen-
dant's statement of a non-racial reason. Thus, the presumption
operates to shift the burden of going forward, but not the bur-
den of persuasion, which remains with the plaintiff." 5 Because
the inference is so strong, and because the courts in effect have
adopted it in section 1982 and similar cases,1 16 the inference
should take the case to the jury regardless of the defendant's
explanation.
The third possibility is that the presumption receives its
greatest possible weight short of an irrebuttable presumption
(which is not a presumption at all, but rather a rule of substan-
tive law). Under this view, if the factfinder believes plaintiff's
evidence as to the existence of the triggering fact (injury), then
the factfinder must find the presumed fact (that the defendant
acted for a reason attributable to race) unless the defendant not
only comes forward with credible evidence to the contrary, but
113 See, e.g., Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1070 (1974); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1021 (1974); cf. Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1973).
114 See Subrin, supra note 111, at 184-92.
11- The same result could be achieved by treating the presumption as sufficient
evidence of the presumed fact, to be weighed by the factfinder, even after the defendant
introduces some evidence counter to the presumed fact. The House version of Federal
Rule of Evidence 301 handled presumptions in this manner, H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973), but the Senate Committee on the Judiciary criticized this
approach on the ground that presumptions are not evidence. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974). The conference committee also rejected this draft. H.R. REp.
No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1974).
1"6E.g., Harris v. Jones, 296 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Mass. 1969).
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also persuades the factfinder of the truth of that contrary evi-
dence. This test therefore shifts both the burden of going for-
ward and the burden of persuasion. The second and third tests
differ in that if the factfinder is in equipoise between believing
and disbelieving the defendant's testimony, the plaintiff wins
under the third test and the defendant wins under the second.
Consider once more the example of the plaintiff who seeks
to rent an apartment from a landlord who insists that the apart-
ment is available only to those recommended by present tenants.
As previously indicated, 117 proof of these facts plus proof that
similarly situated whites could rent comparable apartments else-
where without such a restriction establishes the prima facie case.
Suppose that defendant testifies and denies the plaintiff's ver-
sion of the facts, stating that he or she told plaintiff that it would
be "helpful" if plaintiff knew someone in the apartment build-
ing, but that the reason for the refusal was that defendant's
agent had previously committed the apartment and defendant
felt bound by that commitment.
Assuming that a presumption which shifts the burden of
persuasion applies, and that our suggested definition of section
1982 is adopted, the factfinder must find for plaintiff if: (a) it
finds that defendant refused the apartment because plaintiff was
black; or (b) it finds that the defendant in fact employed a policy
of renting only to friends of the present tenants, and the judge
has determined that such policy meets the legal definition of
"attributable to race"; or (c) the judge rules that the alleged
policy meets the legal definition of "attributable to race," and the
factfinder is in equipoise as to the reason for the non-rental. On
the other hand, if the presumption shifts the burden of going
forward but not the burden of persuasion, and if the inference
remains, then plaintiff will prevail under conditions (a) and (b),
but not under condition (c). If the factfinder believes defen-
dant's explanation, then defendant wins regardless of which in-
terpretation of section 1982 applies and regardless of which pre-
sumption is adopted.
We have argued that a definition of "same right . as is
enjoyed by white citizens" which takes community practices into
consideration is appropriate. We now suggest that proof of a
prima facie case should shift both the burden of proof and the
117 See text accompanying notes 64-72 supra.
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burden of persuasion. Although the problems of definition and
of procedure are not solved by reference to identical considera-
tions, our solutions reflect at least one common concern: that
the factfinding process do justice to the purpose of section 1982.
In addition, similar considerations are relevant both in al-
locating the burden of persuasion and in determining whether
to employ a presumption. 118 As we have previously tried to
demonstrate, those considerations favor the employment of a
presumption; they also favor shifting the burden of persuasion
to the defendant once the presumption is raised. 1 9
Finally, factfinders-particularly jurors-are more likely to
be overly hostile to the purposes of section 1982 than they are
likely to be overly enthusiastic about the statutory purposes. If
bias enters the factf'mding process, it is more likely to be a pro-
defendant (white) bias than it is a pro-plaintiff (black) bias. If the
judgment of Congress, appellate courts, and presidential com-
missions is accurate, 20 then to the extent that white people have
feelings about non-whites, those feelings probably are negative
rather than positive. Thus, in a very real sense, it is inaccurate to
say that it is as hard to disprove racial prejudice as it is to prove
racial prejudice.' 2 1 Proof does not exist for its own sake; a matter
is not proved until a factfinder performs its function and deter-
mines "what happened." Once the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, the effect of the presumption should be to shift both
the burden of going forward and the burden of persuasion to
the defendant for the simplest of reasons: As a practical matter,
1 isCompare authorities cited note 111 supra with McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 337 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
119 Contra, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1610, 1618 (1975). This commentator argues that as an
empirical matter, it is incorrect to assume that on the facts in Clark v. Universal Builders,
Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974), it was more likely than not
that race was a factor in defendants' pricing policies. In support of this contention the
commentator cites the statement in Clark, 501 F.2d at 333, that "a myriad of permissible
factors" may explain a price differential. Reliance on this phrase is misplaced. In its
original context the phrase was applicable only to "reasonable" price differentials. Id. But
when expert testimony establishes that the differing profit margin is completely out of
line with that which prevails in the industry-that the price differential is
"unreasonable"-it is hardly startling, as either a legal or an empirical matter, that
reasons attributable to race should be deemed the likely explanation for defendant's
conduct. See text accompanying notes 39-41, 63-64 supra. See generally D. McENTmE,
RESIDENCE AND RACE 148-56 (1960); authorities cited note 39 supra.
120 See generally S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., (1964); H.R. REP. No. 914,
88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963); authorities cited note 39 supra.
121 Cf. Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908, 910 n.2 (10th Cir. 1973).
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it is easier for the defendant than for the plaintiff to meet the
burden.
This proposal is hardly revolutionary. The "burden of per-
suasion shift" matters only in those cases in which the factfinder
is near equipoise between believing and disbelieving the
defendant's explanation. In such cases, accurate factfinding is
best served by giving the defendant the burden of persuasion.
122
Indeed, Rule 301 of the Rules of Evidence for United States
Courts and Magistrates, promulgated by the Supreme Court in
1972, adopted the view that a presumption shifts both the bur-
den of going forward and the burden of persuasion: "In all cases
not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules
a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed
the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed
fact is more probable than its existence."'
123
Congress, however, chose not to follow this approach, and
instead opted for a restrictive doctrine that prohibits the use of a
presumption to shift the burden of persuasion, even though the
logic of the situation would suggest such a result. Rule 301 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence as enacted provides:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise
provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a
presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of going forward with evidence to
rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to
122 See Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REv. 906
(1931).
The case law on this point is murky. As the court said in United States v. United
States Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 1045, 1058 n.34 (N.D. Ala. 1973), "The distinction
between the burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of persuasion
... is frequently blurred, even in cases which specifically deal with the issue. See, e.g.,
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 ...." In addition to confusing the two
parts of the burden of proof, courts tend to confuse presumptions with inferences.
Consider the following statement from Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974):
Thus, where a Negro buyer meets the objective requirements of a real estate
developer so that a sale would in all likelihood have been consummated were he
white and where statistics show that all of a substantial number of lots in the
development have been sold only to whites, a prima facie inference of discrimi-
nation arises as a matter of law if his offer to purchase is refused. If the infer-
ence is not satisfactorily explained away, the fact of discrimination becomes
established.
A "prima facie inference... as a matter of law" is a presumption. See also McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803-06 (1973).
123 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 301, 56 F.R.D. 208 (1972).
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such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk
of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial
upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
124
On its face, at least, rule 301 as enacted would seem to
require that any presumption employed in a section 1982 action
brought in a federal court shift only the burden of going for-
ward. Yet as Judge Weinstein has astutely pointed out,125 the
Supreme Court's decision in Keyes v. School District No. 1126
strongly indicates that when a plaintiff proves that one segment
of a school district is intentionally segregated, both the burden
of going forward and the burden of persuasion are shifted to
the school district to show that other schools within the system
are not deliberately segregated. 127 Did Congress intend to over-
rule this aspect of Keyes when it enacted rule 301? Although it
is difficult to imagine Congress' taking so drastic a step without
any discussion of the important social policies that the Court
thought justified shifting the burden of persuasion in Keyes, it
124 The troubled and inconclusive history of rule 301 is set forth in detail in I J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 301-1 to -18 (1975). In a memorandum
to the conference committee, Professor Cleary, who served as Reporter to the Advisory
Committee on Rules of Evidence and the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
of the Judicial Conference of the United States, roundly criticized the ultimate selection
of the "bursting bubble" theory-the theory that a presumption disappears upon the
introducion of evidence that would support a finding of the nonexistence of the pre-
sumed fact. Id. 301-10 to -12.
The confusion is compounded by the conference committee's statement that under
rule 301 as adopted, "If the adverse party offers no evidence contradicting the presumed
fact, the court will instruct the jury that if it finds the basic facts, it may presume the
existence of the presumed fact." H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974)
(emphasis supplied). Thus construed, rule 301 does not deal with presumptions at all,
but rather with inferences. Even under the "bursting bubble" theory, the function of a
presumption is to shift the risk of not going forward. If the defendant offers no evidence
to contradict a presumed fact, and the factfinder believes the triggering facts, then the
factfinder must find the presumed fact. See McCoRMIsC's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 345 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972); Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5
VAND. L. REV. 324, 327 (1952).
125 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 124, at 300-15 to -16.
126 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
127 This burden-shifting principle is not new or novel. There are no hard-
and-fast standards governing the allocation of the burden of proof in every
situation. The issue, rather, "is merely a question of policy and fairness based on
experience in the different situations." 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2486, at 275
(3d ed. 1940). In the context of racial segregation in public education, the
courts, including this Court, have recognized a variety of situations in which
"fairness" and "policy" require state authorities to bear the burden of explaining
actions or conditions which appear to be racially motivated.
Id. at 209.
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is equally difficult to point to anything in the language of rule
301 that dictates to the contrary. 128 One is sorely tempted to ar-
gue that section 1982 (or the fourteenth amendment, in the case
of Keyes) is an example of a situation where Congress has "other-
wise provided" for presumptions to shift both the burden of
coming forward and the burden of persuasion. The effect of
such a reading may be salutary, but this interpretation of the
rule simply is unreasonable. If courts are allowed to "divine the
intent" of Congress regarding the effect of presumptions on a
statute-by-statute basis when the statute itself is silent on the sub-
ject, rule 301 will be rendered meaningless.
Alternatively, a court could remove the mental element (a
reason attributable to race) from the plaintiff's prima facie case
and hold that proof of a reason not attributable to race is an
affirmative defense, thus assuring that the burden of persuasion
on this issue is "originally cast" on the defendant. Although as a
theoretical matter we believe that the mental state of the defen-
dant should constitute an element of the prima facie case, 129 as a
practical matter the only difference between this and our pro-
posal would be that the factfinder could find for the plaintiff
without having to draw an inference that the defendant acted
for a reason attributable to race.
In federal courts, then, until Congress makes clear what
results it intended by the enactment of rule 301, or amends the
rule to permit more flexibility in the effect of presumptions as
they relate to particular fact patterns, 30 there still should exist a
presumption that shifts the burden of going forward to the de-
fendant, with an inference of "reason attributable to race" re-
maining even if defendant comes forward with a reason for his
behavior that is not attributable to race. In state courts, however,
there is room for the more logical development of a presump-
tion that shifts the entire burden of proof to the defendant-a
presumption that requires the defendant to prove a non-racial
reason for his or her treatment of the plaintiff.' 31
128 One interesting result of the enactment of rule 301 may be an increase in § 1982
litigation in state courts, where the rule does not apply. FED. R. EVID. 101. It is settled law
that state courts do have jurisdiction under § 1982. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,
396 U.S. 299 (1969).
129 See text accompanying notes 80-87 supra.
130 California, for example has provided by statute that some presumptions shift the
burden of production, while others shift the entire burden of proof. CAL. EvID. CODE
§ 601 (West 1966).
..1 See note 129 supra.
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III. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has been to clarify discrimina-
tion cases under section 1982 by answering the litigator's basic
questions: What conduct does the statute prohibit? What are the
elements of a prima facie case? What evidence will supply infer-
ences sufficient to make out a prima facie case? What happens
when the defendant responds to the prima facie case? We have
answered these questions in the context of a single statute in
order to promote a precise understanding of what conduct is
prohibited.
By anatomizing section 1982, we have also sought to demys-
tify civil rights litigation generally. Thus, we have emphasized
that analysis of the evidence lacks focus, and even meaning, un-
less there is a clear definition of the legal rule. The question-
"Do facts a, b, and c permit the factfinder to find fact d?"-can
never be answered satisfactorily until we know what fact d is
supposed to be. Yet courts struggle mightily to discern whether
evidence supports an inference of "racial discrimination" with-
out first giving a precise definition to that term.1
3 2
Similarly, we have pointed out that issues of what inferences
are permissible and what presumptions are appropriate should
be resolved in discrimination cases by reference to the same
kinds of considerations as apply in other areas of the law. If
there appears to be a unique feature of civil rights litigation, it is
only that courts have recognized that people normally react to
race. The recognition of this fact, we argue, supports the legal
conclusion that poor treatment of non-whites as compared with
132 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), exemplifies the process.
The Court spent considerable time defining what constitutes a prima facie case and what
constitutes an adequate rebuttal to it, but never defined precisely those ultimate facts that
plaintiff's case permitted the factfinder to find, and what defendant's case, if believed,
compelled the factfinder not to find. If the ultimate fact was whether defendant refused
to hire plaintiff because plaintiff was black, then what of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971), in which the Court indicated that defendant would be liable even in the
absence of racial motivation? Perhaps the "ultimate fact" was whether defendant's action
was not for a good business reason, but the Court did not say.
This problem is not confined to cases involving private discrimination. The jury
discrimination cases also suffer from the tendency of courts to indicate the evidence that
establishes a prima facie case, and to indicate whether defendant's response is adequate,
without indicating that rule of law which, when applied to plaintiff's evidence, permits a
factfinder to find for plaintiff. See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360-61 (1970).
For a scholarly example of the process, see Fessler & Haar, supra note 94, at 446-56
(discussing the prima facie case of a municipal equalization case without defining racial
discrimination).
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whites at a minimum permits the inference that the defendant
acted for reasons attributable to race.
Finally, we have suggested a definition for the state-of-mind
element of section 1982-a reason attributable to race-which
should be relevant both to the interpretation of section 1982 and
to defining racial discrimination generally.
